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APOLOGIZE AND MOVE ON?: FINDING
A REMEDY FOR PORNOGRAPHY,
INSULT, AND HATE SPEECH
SPEECH & RESPECT. By Richard Abel.
Stevens & Sons/Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1994. 200 pp. + xii.
Reviewed by RICHARD DELGADO* & JEAN STEFANCIC**
INTRODUCTION
Recently, the president of a major public university made a
serious accusation of genetic inferiority on the part of students of
color at his campus.1 The remark, which occurred at a closed
meeting of campus officials, was detailed, seemingly well thought
out, and embedded in a larger discussion of academic standards.2
Months later, when his statement came to light, the president at
first attempted to justify and defend his actions, then apologized.'
In defense, the president and his supporters emphasized how he
had staunchly supported minority rights up until then.4 Though
he apologized repeatedly, this did little good, serving only to fan
the flames of controversy.5 As has happened with other public
figures who have attempted to recant toward the ends of their
lives, the president's critics were not content to let matters lie.6
* Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado.
** Research Associate, University of Colorado.
1. See Annette John-Hall, The Man Behind the War of Words at Rutgers, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Feb. 12, 1995, at C1; Denise K. Magner, President of Rutgers U. Struggles
to Control Damage After Comment on Blacks and Standardized Tests, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 10, 1995 at A16.
2. See John-Hall, supra note 1; Magner, supra note 1.
3. Robin Wilson, Flash Point at Rutgers U.: Despite President's Apologies,
Outrage over Racial Comment May Force Him Out, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 24,
1995, at A21.
4. Id.; see also Doreen Carvajal, A Career in the Balance: Rutgers's President
Starts a Firestorm with Three Words, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1995, at BI (noting that the
president's record belies charge of racism).
5. E.g., Bill Maxwell, There's Wisdom in Forgiveness, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Mar.
1, 1995, at 32A.
6. See, e.g., Gary Hart, McNamara's Mea Culpa Offers Invaluable Lessons,
DENV. POST, Apr. 23, 1995, at 10E; Richard Reeves, McNamara Waited Far Too Long
to Speak Out, DAILY CAMERA (Boulder, Colo.), Apr. 21, 1995, at D3. See also infra
part IV (explaining why this often happens).
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When should an apology suffice to close a public or private
dispute? A new book by Richard Abel addresses one aspect of this
question-namely, when the dispute centers around an incident
of hate speech or insult.7 A detailed and textured book, Speech &
Respect is a welcome addition to the literature on speech-based
harms, including pornography, racial insult, and religious
invective.8 In it, Professor Abel joins the growing number of
scholars-still a minority-who believe that redress should be
taken seriously and that marketplace rhetoric should not
automatically trump all claims by women, minorities, and others
injured by vicious speech.9 This book continues the line of
impressive scholarship Abel has contributed over the years
dealing with American lawyers, 10 deformalized justice,1' and the
structure of legal aid, 2 all written from the perspective of a
thoughtful, leftist scholar.
Speech & Respect grew out of an invitation by the Hamlyn
Trust to give a series of lectures at the University of Wales,
Cardiff, in late 1992 (p. 1). The author was invited to address any
subject having to do with the common-law countries and their
legal problems (pp. 1-2). One of only two Americans invited to
give the lectures in the forty-four years of their existence, Abel
chose as his topic the relation of speech and status inequality
(pp. 1-2).
Believing that struggles for respect are intensifying through-
out the world (pp. 2, 23-28), Abel opens with three stories that
show how speech can exacerbate that struggle. The first story
details the way that Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin
7. RICHARD ABEL, SPEECH & RESPECT (1994).
8. For a sampling of work concerning speech-based harms, see, e.g., HENRY L.
GATES ET AL., SPEAKING OF RACE, SPEAKING OF SEX (1994); NAT HENTOFF, FREE
SPEECH FOR ME-BUT NOT FOR THEE (1992); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS
(1993); MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND (1993); ARYEH NEIER,
DEFENDING MY ENEMY (1979); SAMUEL WALKER, HATE SPEECH: THE HISTORY OF AN
AMERICAN CONTROVERSY (1994).
9. See, e.g., MATSUDA ET AL., supra note 8; Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism
Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 343 (1991); Charles
R. Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431; Mari J. Matsuda, Public
Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320
(1989).
10. RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS (1989).
11. Richard L. Abel, The Contradictions of Informal Justice, in 1 THE POLITICS
OF INFORMAL JUSTICE 267 (Richard L. Abel ed., 1982).
12. Richard L. Abel, Law Without Politics: Legal Aid Under Advanced
Capitalism, 32 UCLA L. REV. 474 (1985).
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attempted to enact civil rights ordinances that' would have
enabled women injured by pornography to bring a private action
for redress (pp. 4-8). The second deals with hate speech.
Focusing on Beauharnais v. Illinois1" and City of Chicago v.
Lambert14 (early group libel cases), and the Nazis-in-Skokie15
case, Abel describes the controversies that erupted when hate
groups leafleted, marched, and demonstrated in the neighbor-
hoods of the very groups vilified (pp. 8-11). His third illustration,
"The Satanic Verses," recounts the furor that broke out when
Salman Rushdie wrote a novel that many Muslims found
shameful and blasphemous (pp. 11-22).
Having reminded his readers of the disruptive potential of
racist, antiwoman, and blasphemous remarks, Abel turns to the
question of remedies. Chapter 2 (pp. 33-80) deals with the civil-
libertarian position, which holds that little, if anything, can or
should be done to redress the harms of scathing speech. Abel
rejects this position; the costs of such speech are too high to
ignore (pp. 34-38). Moreover, the state can never be truly neutral
among speakers and messages-it sets up and encourages
markets and property rights in speech by virtually everything it
does (pp. 44-47). Nor are speakers as free and unconstrained as
the civil-libertarian model presupposes. Every speaker finds that
certain ideas are valorized in advance (pp. 47-57). Some are off
limits because of licensing and trademark laws (p. 48). Some
speech (for example, the televised variety) is expensive-only the
wealthy or well-connected can play (pp. 50-51)-and styles and
trends dictate what editors and publishers will consider (p. 52).
Regulation thus occurs whether we like it or not.
Chapter 3 (pp. 81-122), however, argues that the standard
leftist (and Critical Race Theory) response, namely, regulation, is
equally troublesome. One reason is that there is a poor fit
between the thing to be regulated-speech-and law or regula-
tion. This is so because all symbols are irreducibly complicated
and ambiguous, their meaning a product of a complex of factors:
the identity of the speaker, his or her motive, the relationship
between the speaker and the listener, the setting in which the
speech-act occurs, and the audience that witnesses it (pp. 25-26,
13. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
14. 197 N.E.2d 448 (Ill. App. Ct. 1964).
15. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978); Village of Skokie v. National
Socialist Party of Am., 373 N.E.2d 21 (111. 1978).
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81, 86, 137-41): Law is cumbersome and dichotomous, relying on
rigid categories (e.g., specification; public/private) that are
necessarily over- and underinclusive and that cannot easily take
account of the multifarious quality of speech (pp. 86, 97-103).
Moreover, heavy-handed regulation only makes martyrs out of
bigots, giving them an audience, allowing them to think of
themselves as victims (pp. 102-04), and doubling the harm to the
victim by repeating what was said at the trial or hearing (p. 103-
04). In many cases, the harm that supposedly justifies a pornog-
raphy ordinance or hate-speech law will be difficult to prove:
there is no straight-line correlation between consumption of
pornography and commission of rape or other harms to women,
for example (pp. 93-94). And, if we draft regulations narrowly
aimed at clear-cut cases of harmful speech, like "You Nigger, go
back to Africa, you don't belong on this campus," we allow less
easily defined harms or more sophisticated versions of the same
messages ("Leon, are you sure you are not in over your head at
this school?") to slip through (pp. 97-103).
In his final chapter, Abel offers a surprising solution to the
Scylla and Charybdis of laissez-faire and heavy-handed regula-
tion: the apology (pp. 136-52). This would not be a formal
requirement but rather one enforced by community pressure (p.
144-49). The person who spoke the wounding message would be
required to render an explanation and apologize to the victim (p.
145-46).. No prosecutor or other public authority would play a
part (p. 144-47). Instead, the victim would control the commence-
ment of the proceedings (p. 142-43). The resulting hearing would
not be neutral, as in court, but partial and partisan: the purpose
would be to get the offender to see the error of his or her ways and
make amends to the victim (p. 143). The status injury of the
speech, in which the victim is degraded while the speaker
elevates himself or herself at the victim's expense, would thereby
be set right. This process would sensitize speakers to the harm
they cause, make the victims feel better, and establish and
strengthen community norms against this type of behavior in the
future (p. 145). The process, in effect, is the punishment (p. 145).
In this essay, we focus on Abel's remedy-the apology.
Although we admire Abel's scholarship and welcome much of
what he says, we believe that his solution falls short. In Part I,
we provide a brief overview of the hate-speech controversy. In
Part II, we turn to Abel's remedy, arguing that it is too
mild-that it trivializes the harm of racist and sexist speech. We
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suggest in Part III that it ignores an implicit power dimension
lurking in much invective. Finally, in Part IV, we urge that
apology proceedings suffer from a number of practical and
theoretical difficulties, some of which seem insurmountable.
These difficulties stem from the same source: thinking of racial
and other insults in terms of status offenses when they are, in
fact, much more than that.'6 We close with a few thoughts of our
own on what a proper remedy for the harms of hate speech might
be.
I. THE HATE-SPEECH DEBATE
Beginning around 1979, many campuses and universities
began experiencing an upsurge in the number and virulence of
racist incidents aimed at students of color, women, and sexual
minorities.' Some of the incidents included outright violence,
such as attacks and beatings, or arson directed at buildings
housing minority groups.'" Others took the form of face-to-face
insults, graffiti, or leaflets disparaging minority students and
questioning their right to attend the university.'9 According to
the Chronicle of Higher Education, at least 175 campuses have
experienced racial unrest serious enough to receive news cover-
age;2" according to the National Institute Against Prejudice and
Violence, twenty to twenty-five percent of students of color are the
target of hate speech during each college year.2' Experts are
divided on the cause of the increase. Some believe it is the result
of better reporting or heightened sensitivity on the part of groups
that formerly accepted their victimization in silence.22 Others
16. See infra parts II, III.
17. Richard Delgado & David H. Yun, Pressure Valves and Bloodied Chickens:
An Analysis of Paternalistic Objections to Hate Speech Regulation, 82 CAL. L. REV.
871, 872 (1994).
18. Delgado, supra note 9, at 343, 349, 351, 353, 357.
19. Richard Delgado & David Yun, The Neoconservative Case Against Hate-
Speech Regulation-Lively, D'Souza, Gates, Carter, and the Toughlove Crowd, 47
VAND. L. REV. 1807, 1810 (1994). See also Delgado, supra note 9, at 349-50, 352-53,
357.
20. Denise K. Magner, Blacks and Whites on the Campuses: Behind Ugly Racist
Incidents, Student Isolation and Insensitivity, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 26, 1989,
at Al, A28.
21. Howard Ehrlich et al., The Traumatic Impact of Ethnoviolence, in THE PRICE
WE PAY: THE CASE AGAINST HATE SPEECH AND PORNOGRAPHY (Laura Lederer &
Richard Delgado eds., 1995).
22. Delgado & Yun, supra note 17, at 873.
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believe that the increase is real, pointing out that it mirrors an
upsurge in anti-woman slurs, hassling, and hard-core pornogra-
phy, as well as attacks on foreigners and immigrants taking place
throughout the Western world.23
Whatever its cause, the increase in hate speech has sparked
concern on the part of campus authorities, a number of whom
have responded by enacting student conduct codes that penalize
different types of face-to-face epithets and invectives.24 These
codes were immediately challenged in court, where many were
struck down.25  Then, the tide began to turn. Courts began
upholding sexual-harassment prohibitions in the workplace.26
Shortly after deciding the "cross burning case,"2 the Supreme
Court approved sentencing enhancement for bias-motivated
crimes.2" And, across the border, the Canadian Supreme Court
upheld national legislation penalizing hate speech29 and hard-core
pornography.3 °
On the scholarly front, academics began calling for a "First
Amendment legal realism" that would replace the formalistic set
of mechanical "tests" and special doctrines that have held sway
since the early years of the century. Under this new approach,
free-speech doctrine would be informed by a host of factors,
including the setting of a particular message, its consequences, its
victims, and the speaker who uttered it.32 First Amendment
doctrine would join other areas of law, such as torts, contracts,
and search-and-seizure doctrine, that are shaped by experience,
not science, and policy, not logic.33 Prompted, perhaps, by the
23. Id.
24. Delgado & Yun, supra note 19, at 1810.
25. Id. at 1811.
26. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
27. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (declaring invalid under the
First Amendment a city ordinance that prohibited bias-motivated disorderly conduct).
28. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
29. Regina v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697.
30. Regina v. Butler, 89 D.L.R. 4th 449 (1992).
31. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist
Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DuKE L.J. 375; Richard Delgado, First
Amendment Formalism Is Giving Way to First Amendment Legal Realism, 29 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 169 (1994); Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A
Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1; Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI.
L. REV. 255 (1992).
32. Delgado, supra note 31, at 170-71.
33. On the notion, embraced by many of the early realists, that the life of the
law is experience, not logic or science, see Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense
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sense that free-speech law must evolve to serve the needs of a
changing society, and propelled by the insistent critique of
feminists and anti-hate-speech scholars, the movement from First
Amendment formalism to realism is now well under way.34 It is
against this background that Richard Abel's book, Speech &
Respect, appears with its startling suggestion that "status harms"
be remedied by means of an apology. We now turn to this aspect
of Abel's book in greater detail.
II. THE TRIVIALIZATION CRITIQUE: WHY AN APOLOGY CANNOT
REDRESS THE HARM OF RACIST OR MISOGYNIST SPEECH
Our principal reservation about Abel's remedy is that it is too
mild, and thus it trivializes the injury of hate speech. An apology
is surely much milder than the criminal prosecution that led to
the Beauharnais v. Illinois35 case or the measures contemplated
by various international conventions dealing with racial incite-
ment.36 And we have no doubt that most persons charged with
hate offenses would consider an apology less onerous than the
remedies provided for in typical campus hate-speech codes, such
as an official reprimand or suspension." Indeed, we shall argue
in the next two sections that the mild nature of an apology
renders it almost wholly inadequate to redress and deter hate
crimes and hate speech. It atomizes the harm, fails to consider
its power dimension, and leaves the perpetrator intact and the
victim unredressed. It cuts off consideration of broader issues
and encourages all concerned to go on with their lives as if
and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935); Oliver W. Holmes, The
Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897); Roscoe Pound, The End of Law as
Developed in Juristic Thought, 27 HARV. L. REV. 605 (1914).
34. Delgado, supra note 31.
35. 343 U.S. 250 (1952). The petitioner in Beauharnais distributed flyers that
were degrading to African Americans; he subsequently was fined $200 under a
provision in the Illinois Criminal Code outlawing the publication or exhibition of any
lithograph that exposed the citizens of any race to contempt or derision. Id.
36. For a discussion of the various conventions and covenants that require
nations to control hate crimes, hate speech, and hard-core pornography, see Richard
Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Cosmopolitanism Inside Out: International Norms and the
Struggle for Civil Rights and Local Justice, 27 CONN. L. REV. 773 (1995); Delgado,
supra note 9, at 361-71.
37. For a general discussion of campus hate-speech codes, including their
enforcement, see Delgado, supra note 9; Lawrence, supra note 9; Matsuda, supra
note 9.
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nothing very serious has happened. An apology can thus make
matters even worse.38
Why such a light remedy? Perhaps part of the reason may be
simply disciplinary. Abel is a social scientist as well as a lawyer,
and much of social science (particularly sociology) is greatly
concerned with status and status harms.39  These harms can
easily be seen as not particularly serious; we consider excessive
preoccupation with status unseemly and petty. But hate speech
and pornography are more than status harms. The feminists who
attempted to enact the Minneapolis antipornography ordinance
believe that pornography does not merely cause a dignitary harm
to women, but increases the very real incidence of sexual objectifi-
cation, harassment, and rape.4" Students and scholars of color
who wish to curb racist hate speech do not want merely to feel
better about themselves. They want to improve the campus
climate for minority students, change the current ignominious
image of persons of color to a more neutral one, and prevent the
type of physical violence for which a racial epithet is often a
precursor.41 But seeing these harms in status terms can easily
lead one to think that a mild remedy such as an apology is all
that is called for. Abel may have fallen prey to his own disciplin-
ary bias.
Two additional considerations can also account for the way in
which otherwise supportive scholars such as Abel shy away from
effective remedies.42 The first has to do with the perceived extent
of the problem of race and racism. As we have pointed out, it is
easy for a person of majoritarian hue to underestimate the
amount of.racism (and homophobia and sexism) in the world.43
38. See infra part IV.
39. See e.g., JOHN K. GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY (4th ed. 1984); R.M.
MACIVER & CHARLES H. PAGE, SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS 348-83 (1967);
ROBERT K. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 380-84 (rev. ed. 1957);
VANCE PACKARD, THE STATUS SEEKERS (1959). See also ABEL, supra note 7, at 24-28
(discussing status competition in contemporary life).
40. See ANDREA DWORKIN & CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, PORNOGRAPHY AND CIVIL
RIGHTS: A NEW DAY FOR WOMEN'S EQUALITY (1988).
41. E.g., MATSUDA, supra note 8; Delgado, supra note 9; Lawrence, supra note
9; Matsuda, supra note 9.
42. For other progressive scholars who express concern over the consequences
of hate speech or pornography but nevertheless conclude that very little can (or
should) be done, see GATES ET AL., supra note 8; NEIER, supra note 8; WALKER, supra
note 8; Nadine Strossen, Regulating Free Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?
1990 DUKE L.J. 484.
43. Richard Delgado, Critical Legal Studies and the Realities of Race-Does the
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Few of the relevant vignettes play out in front of him or her. A
shopkeeper who routinely hassles well-behaved black teenagers
is unlikely to do so if another person is watching.44 A police
officer is not likely to treat a black motorist in a discriminatory
fashion if there are several onlookers, and so on.45 Yet, these and
similar incidents befall minorities of color all the time.46 We
believe this mechanism-the differential frequency with which
both groups see and experience racism-may explain why a
person like Abel who deplores racism, but believes it relatively
rare, might be satisfied with a remedy that does little to deter
offenders or change the status quo.
A second mechanism that might explain why Abel and others
who believe that redress ought to be taken seriously nevertheless
shrink from effective remedies we have termed the empathic
fallacy.47 This mechanism consists of our believing that we can
talk back against racism and other social evils, that we can
change our own and others' consciousness through verbal
means-exhortation, appeals, storytelling, brief-writing, and so
on-aimed at demonstrating the error of the offender's ways.4"
This is a mistake. One can often persuade another person that he
or she is in error with respect to a small, bounded point or a
matter of fact.49 But deeply inscribed social evils, like racism and
sexism, that are woven into our very patterns of thought and
discourse are not so easily dispelled. They form part of our
mindset, the collection of stories and narratives by which we
organize experience, including acceptance or rejection of new
stories such as those offered by a race reformer.5" History shows
that the dominant stereotypes of a particular era-for example,
that of lazy, hypersexual, or animalistic blacks-are rarely seen
as especially offensive at the time.5' It is only years later, when
consciousness and conditions shift, that we look back and ask,
Fundamental Contradiction Have a Corollary?, 23 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 407-
09 (1988); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American
Law and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills? 77 CORNELL L.
REV. 1258, 1282-83 (1992).
44. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 43, at 1282.
45. See id. (effect of observers).
46. Delgado, supra note 43, at 408-09.
47. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 43, at 1281.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1277.
50. Id. at 1278-79, 1280.
51. Id. at'1275-76, 1277 n.151.
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how could we have believed that?52 This inability to perceive the
dominant racism of our time bodes ill for language-based reme-
dies, such as the apology that Abel touts, that contain a "more
speech" aspect (pp. 144-51). It also should raise doubts about
mild remedies, such as a word and a handshake, as deterrents for
future misbehavior. The person who utters hate speech is
unlikely to see what he or she has done as very serious."3 When
approached by a spokesperson for Abel's community group bent
on bringing the perpetrator and victim together for a struggle
session, the former is apt to respond with laughter or disbelief:
"Why are you taking this so seriously? Lighten up."
Abel's book contains many passages that lead us to believe he
has failed to come to grips with the damaging nature of hate
speech. For example, he continually refers to the harm of racist
speech as an affront to dignity, status, honor, sensibility, or
respect (e.g., pp. 4, 14, 23, 24, 28, 37, 123, 134, 145, 147, 149,
151). His main discussion of the effects of racist speech does not
include suicide, depression, drug-taking, damaged self-image,
poor school achievement or dropout, or high blood pressure,
consequences social scientists and minority scholars have noted.54
He does not concern himself with the frequency of racist hate.
speech, such as reports by the National Institute Against
Prejudice and Violence that the average black undergraduate is
victimized several times during the course of his four years on
campus.55 Indeed, Abel's lengthiest discussion of the harms
associated with speech concerns cigarette and alcohol advertising
(pp. 37-38). The harms of censorship, by contrast, are spelled out
in considerably greater detail (pp. 5, 38-58, 149-52). Could this
be because professional-class whites see relatively few acts of out-
and-out racism, but do see, hear, and discuss many cases of
"political correctness" gone awry,56 of student groups who carry
redress for slights and insults to excess?
52. Id. at 1278-79, 1281.
53. Id. at 1282-83, 1288.
54. For a discussion of these and other consequences of racism and racist speech,
see, e.g., Matsuda, supra note 9, at 2336-38; Richard Delgado, Words That Wound:
A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 133, 136-49 (1982).
55. Ehrlich et al., supra note 21.
56. One can imagine stories of vengeful and humorless thought police of the left,
supposedly bent on enforcing some idealized, sanitized code of proper speech and
behavior.
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Abel's book is full of examples that bear out our trivialization
thesis. For example, pornography's critics point out that models
and actresses in the pornography industry may suffer very real
harm;57 Abel observes that ballet dancers suffer injuries too (p.
94). And in the concluding passages of the book, after outlining
his apology solution, Abel points out that an apology's weaknesses
ought to be accepted. One of those weaknesses is that certain
communities may refuse to redress racist insults and decide not
to require an apology (p. 148). What then of the black man or
woman who stumbles into such a community unaware? This may
happen, Abel concedes, "[y]et this fear may be exaggerated. The
liberal consensus against discrimination has been growing ....
Successful community efforts to redress the harms of speech will
broaden and deepen that consensus, allowing the state to extend
the expectation of equality, as it has been doing since the Enlight-
enment." (p.148) This passage is at odds with reports of increas-
ing racism, anti-Semitism, and anti-immigrant sentiment taking
place everywhere in the Western world,58 as well as with survey
results indicating that black parents believe conditions today are
the worst they have been for twenty years, that their children will
lose job and educational opportunities because of racial discrimi-
nation, and that their sons are at serious risk of death or assault
by the police." Abel writes:
Let me conclude ... by stressing how far we have come ....
Racist . . . slurs that pervaded polite discourse have been
banished .... Crude media stereotypes now startle and shock
.... Public homophobia is in retreat. Communal regulation
of harmful speech builds on these small victories in the
unending struggle for a more humane society.
(p. 152) If, as many commentators believe, racism and homopho-
bia are instead on the rise, a mild remedy such as an apology will
likely prove inadequate.
57. DWORKIN & MACKINNON, supra note 40, at 42-44.
58. E.g., STRIKING A BALANCE: HATE SPEECH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND NON-
DISCRIMINATION (Sandra Coliver ed., 1992).
59. Richard Whitmire, 'Major Crisis"for Black Children, DENV. POST, May 27,
1994, at A2; see also ELLIS COSE, THE RISE OF A PRIVILEGED CLASS (1993) (reporting
similar polls and interview material showing high rates of black frustration and
pessimism).
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III. THE POWER CRITIQUE: How TO COIN AN INADEQUATE
REMEDY BY FAILING TO UNDERSTAND How RACIST AND
OTHER FORMS OF DEGRADING SPEECH ARE NOT MERE
LAPSES OR MISTAKES, BUT INTENTIONAL AFFRONTS
In our opinion, Abel's apology solution not only is too mild for
the harm it aims to redress, but it also mistakes the very nature
of that harm. Most racist insults are not mere oversights or slips
of the tongue. ° (Imagine, for example, someone saying, "Gosh, I
had no idea people like you did not like being referred to as
'Nigger."') The racist insult does not attempt to convey new
information; nor is it the kind of communication that could
readily be improved by further communication. "Nigger, go back
to Africa, you don't belong on this campus" conveys little informa-
tion because the hearer already knows that (1) he is an African
American; (2) his ancestors come from that continent; and (3)
many persons like this one on the campus dislike him and wish
he were not there.6 '
Rather, the racial insult is more like a performative. An
instrument of oppression, it relocates the speaker and listener on
a continuum of power and social authority.62 According to many
feminists, pornography does the same with women-it sexualizes
violence and reinforces patriarchal attitudes and behaviors, such
as leering, pressured sex, and objectification. 3 Demeaning
remarks, then, are not primarily informational, but instrumental
means of keeping others down. They are power moves, concerted
and orchestrated by the speaker and others like him or her in a
semiconscious design, drawing on a history of similar remarks
and treatment.64 Their purpose is to remind the victim what his
or her position is in relation to the speaker and, by speaking this
reminder, to make it so.
Abel urges minority victims of hate speech to talk back (pp.
135, 143). But how can one talk back to a power move? Would
one say, "Excuse me, sir. I, an African American, have an equal
60. Delgado, supra note 9, at 372-74; Delgado & Yun, supra note 17, at 871, 884.
61. Delgado & Yun, supra note 17, at 885.
62. On the power dimension of social slurs and epithets, see Delgado, supra note
9, at 383-86.
63. E.g., DWORKIN & MACKINNON, supra note 40, at 72-75 (describing
pornography's role in constructing male-female relationships).
64. For a discussion on the concerted quality of racial mistreatment, which
operates through compounding, see Delgado, supra note 9, at 383-86.
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right, under prevailing standards of morality and constitutional
law, to attend this university?" The speaker already knows this.
Or would the response be, "Sir, did you realize that I, an African
American citizen, find your use of the term 'Nigger' offensive?"
Again, the speaker already knows this. Calling the speaker a
bigot or ignoramus is an invitation to a fight and scarcely cures
the harm inflicted by the first message.6"
Abel might reply that the peer pressure inherent in his small-
group sessions will compensate for any power imbalance between
the hate speaker and his or her victim. This requires a closer
look at these sessions. Abel describes the goal of the sessions as
an "informal conversation between victim and offender. First the
offender must be allowed to offer an account, an alternative
interpretation of ambiguous words and impenetrable motives. To
the extent that the victim honors this account the wound may be
salved." (p. 146) Then, "any lingering resentment must be
mollified and persistent status inequality corrected by an apol-
ogy." (p. 146)
For Abel, such an apology must not be perfunctory or merely
formal.
[O]ffenders must affirm the norm, acknowledge its violation,
and accept responsibility. Such a social exchange of respect
can neutralize the insult. The offender owes, offers, or gives an
apology, thereby acknowledging moral inferiority; the offended
accepts it, thereby restoring the offender to a plane of moral
equality, or rejects it, preserving the moral imbalance.
(p. 146) Such an informal conversation is to take place not as the
last step in a judicial proceeding but rather as the outcome of a
meeting initiated by the victim (p. 145-46). The local collectivity
will bring the two together for a conversation leading to the
apology that ends the dispute (p. 146-48).
There are a number of difficulties with this procedure. First,
the initiator is the grievant himself or herself. This is necessarily
so, for the process Abel contemplates is entirely informal-there
is no third party such as a prosecutor or university dean who
could hear of the event, file charges, and hold a hearing (p.145).
65. Delgado & Yun, supra note 17, at 884 (pointing out that many racial
beatings or killings began just this way: a group badgered a black or Asian; the latter
spoke back and. paid with his life).
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This means that the victim must alert the relevant community to
what has happened, convene a panel or group (Abel is nonspecific
on who this will be), and initiate the discussion. The grievant,
however, will often be ill-equipped to do all these things. As a
recent target of a stinging remark, he or she may have withdrawn
into introspection.66 Moreover, the nature of hate speech ensures
that the victim will often be an "outsider"-one who has no
community or, at any rate, not one the perpetrator will recognize
as his or hers.67 The victim may not know which whites will be
sympathetic. Lacking power and authority, the victim may be
unable to summon a group or persuade the offender to take part
in his or her own "degradation ritual."6 The offender may see no
reason to apologize. Disliking members of the target group, he or
she may refuse to cooperate or do so only in an insincere or
supercilious way. The apology, if it comes at all, may come too
late, long after the harm is done.69
Even if the perpetrator can be made to sit down with the
complaining party, the informal setting in which the dispute will
be aired is exactly the wrong way to redress a racial harm. One
of the most insistent critiques of alternative dispute resolution
holds that deformalized justice exacerbates power differentials
among disputants.7" Formal proceedings also have their defects,
as everyone knows.71 But in the courtroom a host of rules and
expectations reduce both the sway of prejudice as well as the
likelihood that that impulse will find expression in the first
place.72 The victim is represented by a lawyer, who has a time to
speak and a prescribed way of speaking.73 The parties address
not each other but the judge or jury."4 The surroundings,
66. On the demoralizing or traumatic effect of some racial epithets, see, e.g.,
Delgado, supra note 54, at 137, 146-47.
67. For survey material on the incidence of racial victimization, see THE PRICE
WE PAY: THE CASE AGAINST HATE SPEECH AND PORNOGRAPHY (Laura Lederer &
Richard Delgado eds., 1995); see also Ehrlich et al., supra note 21.
68. The term is Professor Abel's (p. 146).
69. See Reeves, supra note 6.
70. See, e.g., Abel, supra note 11; Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and
Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985
WIS. L. REV. 1359. Earlier, Abel was one of the most noted critics of deformalized
solutions to legal problems. See Abel, supra note 11.
71. For example, judges can be biased, the atmosphere can be intimidating, and
the high cost of litigation can deter grievants.
72. Delgado et al., supra note 70, at 1370-75.
73. Id. at 1372, 1388.
74. Id. at 1368-70.
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including the flags, robes, raised platform, and other trappings of
formality, remind everyone present that this is an occasion in
which the values of the American Creed are to preponderate,
rather than the less noble ones many of us embrace during
moments of intimacy, such as in a private club or bar, or when
chatting with friends.75
This "fairness and formality" critique bodes ill for Abel's
remedy. Unless the convened group identifies strongly with the
complainant, all the ingrained expectations, power disparities,
and personal histories of the two protagonists are likely to come
to the fore and be magnified.76 The more empowered actor will
summon up privilege, expecting the best." He or she will
cultivate, and probably obtain, rapport with the jury or audience
and will expect, and probably receive, the benefit of the doubt
with regard to subtle interpretations of the message.7" The
victim, by contrast, will feel insecure and alone. How likely, from
such a setting, is justice to emerge?
The notion of bringing offenders and victims together in
hopes of reconciliation is enormously appealing.79 It can heal
wounds and enable both parties to come to understand each
other's humanity.8" But the few experiments that appear
successful at this have concerned rehabilitation of persons
convicted of crimes of violence or burglary."' They are highly
structured, with the meetings controlled by an experienced
intermediary. There is little doubt about the relevant norm nor
about who is expected to give way and admit error.8 2 The sessions
Abel describes have few of these features, and they cannot easily
be built in. Unfortunately, racism is one of those entrenched
75. Id. at 1383-84, 1387-88.
76. Id. See also Trina GriUo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for
Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991).
77. For example, the offender is likely to remark to himself or herself, "surely
they won't want me (an executive, fraternity member, professor) to abase myself too
much, especially considering who is making the accusation (a janitor, student, gay,
etc.)."
78. Delgado et al., supra note 70, at 1391-99.
79. On programs aimed at bringing offenders and their victims together in hopes
of reconciliation, see Eileen Dempsey, Criminals, Victims Can Reconcile Through
Program, COLUMBUs DISPATCH, Mar. 6, 1994, at 3C; Doug Hoagland, Learning to
Forgive, FRESNO BEE, Feb. 5, 1995, at Fl.
80. See Grillo, supra note 76.
81. Id.
82. In these circumstances, the criminal is presumed to be at fault and is thus
expected to repent. Id.
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patterns of behavior that requires a formal structure, such as a
courtroom proceeding, to be redressed.83
IV. PRACTICABILITY AND THE PROBLEM OF PRESERVING THE
PAST: CAN AN APOLOGY EVER UNDO A RACIAL HARM?
As we have been urging, the apology is inadequate to deal
with most racial harms. It is too mild,84 and it cannot easily
redress the power dimension of racist slurs and epithets.8 5 But
not all remedies operate perfectly; sometimes the fit between a
measure and the event it is intended to correct is less than one
hundred percent-we are satisfied with rough justice. 6 Never-
theless, we believe that Abel's approach is flawed in a third way,
one that raises questions about its ability ever to redress the
harms of hate speech, pornography, and group insult.
This third set of defects has to do with practicability. As
everyone knows, an apology can be grudging or insincere. 7 Many
persons, forced to apologize, take the opportunity to justify their
actions or even to drive the insult home a second time. 8 The root
meaning of apology (apologia) is a defense or rationalization of
what was done. 9 Many offenders, particularly those of high
positions, may be apt to respond in this manner. The victim can
find the situation "flipped"--he or she can be depicted as a
hypersensitive, vengeful, or petty person who cannot let a small
grievance lie, or as one who imagines an offense where none was
intended.9" The perpetrator can proclaim, "I've already apolo-
gized, yet you are asking for more."
Other perpetrators, called on the carpet, can use their
apology as a means of closing off a more searching examination
of their conduct. In the words of our title, they can issue a
perfunctory mea culpa and then insist that the balance has been
83. See Delgado et al., supra note 70.
84. See supra part II.
85. See supra part III.
86. For example, tort law rarely compensates victims for their delay and
attorney fees, and the Fourth Amendment's main remedy is the exclusionary rule.
87. For example, the offender might reply, "If I hurt your feelings, I apologize."
88. Again, the offender might be heard to say, "I had no idea you people didn't
like being called wops; you are Italian, after all."
89. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 552 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner eds., 2d
ed. 1989).
90. For example, the offender might retort, "I had no idea you were so sensitive,
so I guess I'm sorry."
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set right and that it is time to move on. The apology can serve to
deflect the need for more searching analysis of the behavior of a
person or an institution. 9'
Apologies are rarely accepted evenhandedly. We accept light
remedies mainly from persons like ourselves, of our own race and
class, those in whose good faith and citizenship we wish to
continue to believe but who have merely lapsed on this one
occasion-business executives, university presidents, teenagers
guilty of pranks.92 One rarely hears of poor people or African
Americans allowed to escape responsibility for offenses that they
commit (such as shoplifting) by means of a simple apology. Their
offenses, we believe, are real and serious.
Underlying each of these difficulties is a tension over what
we call "claiming the past." An apology, once accepted, enables
the giver to hold his or her head high. It atomizes the transac-
tion, deflecting inquiry from larger patterns of responsibility that
reach to other persons and to this person's previous actions.93 For
example, in the case mentioned at the beginning of this essay, a
university president was charged with suggesting that students
of color at his campus were genetically inferior.94 Though he
apologized publicly, his critics would not let matters lie, insisting
instead that the offensive message cast the president's past in a
new light. He had supported minority causes in the past. But
perhaps his appointment of a few black assistants was tokenism,
his commitment of funds to black student organizations a way of
buying off discontent.95 They saw his apology as a power move-a
way of forestalling the more searching introspection required of
one likely to have engaged in a pattern of misbehavior and now
wanting to get off lightly. Both sides, in other words, challenged
each other's interpretation of the relationship between the
president's deed and his seemingly impeccable past. For one
group, the offense placed his past in doubt, so that a mere apology
91. Compare in this regard an apology (for one act) with a confession (for an
entire course of conduct).
92. On the light treatment society often affords offenders like these, see Richard
Delgado, Rodrigo's Eighth Chronicle: Black Crime, White Fears-On the Social
Construction of Threat, 80 VA. L. REV. 503 (1994).
93. See supra note 88.
94. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
95. Comments from the floor, Address at the Rutgers University School of Law
by Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Hate Speech Today (faculty colloquium) (Feb.
13, 1995).
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was insufficient. For the other (the president's sympathizers), his
previous good deeds rendered the recent lapse minor. People of
good will should accept his apology and move on.96
CONCLUSION
Abel's book is a welcome addition to the literature on hate
speech because it focuses attention on the ubiquity of these
offenses, as well as on the need for new approaches. His primary
mechanism for resolving these conflicts, however, does not do
justice to the nature of hate speech or pornography, nor to the
power dimensions they contain. Apologies, if heartfelt, can salve
wounded feelings and prompt the offender to reflect on what he
or she has done (p. 146). But they are also apt to be insin-
cere-power moves calculated to put the victim himself or herself
on the defensive. 7 Their implementation lies in the hands of "the
community," an informal and amorphous group likely only to
magnify existing power and status differentials between the
victim and the perpetrator. 9s  They enable perpetrators to
preserve their pasts, when their actions may, in fact, call for more
searching inquiry. 99
What, then, would the ideal remedy for hate speech look like?
As we have argued, the process must be formal, not informal.
Thus, the remedy for campus hate speech must include a
disciplinary hearing of some sort, with a judge or hearing officer
and a panel, similar to a jury. It is desirable, as Abel quite
correctly points out, that the hearing serve an educational
function. Consequently, universities should design procedures
that are public rather than secret. Students and other members
of the campus community should be invited to attend, as should
the press. The event can serve to strengthen community norms
against racial transgression and insult, while impressing upon
the offender the seriousness of what he or she has done. The
penalties, however, could be relatively mild-reprimands or short
96. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 38-40, 93-96.
98. See supra notes 67-75 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., supra notes 63-
64 and accompanying text (discussing the role of pornography in preserving power
differentials between men and women).
99. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
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suspensions-trading a greater certainty of punishment for the
seriousness of the penalty.
Such approaches would combine the teachings of the fairness
and formality critique and the concerns for communal norms and
reinforcement that Abel emphasizes. No approach is guaranteed
success. With what we know about human nature, human
vulnerability, and the limits the Constitution imposes, all we can
do is experiment. Racial harms are among the more troubling
ones our system of law and politics is required to address. Abel's
book continues the serious discussion of these issues. His remedy
falls short, but this should not detract from the effort he has
made. The Hamlyn Lectures granted Abel an opportunity to
explore these vital topics and so contributed to legal discourse,
just as their originator intended.

